The Chief Election Commissioner is, by most reasonable measures, the most powerful unelected figure in Indian politics. The CEC decides when 97 crore voters go to the polls. The CEC enforces the Model Code of Conduct. The CEC adjudicates whether a Prime Ministerial campaign speech crossed a line. And — here is the operative bit for the CJP manifesto — the CEC sits atop the machinery that adds and deletes names from the electoral roll.
So how, exactly, is this person held to account?
How the CEC gets appointed
For seven decades, the Chief Election Commissioner and the two Election Commissioners were appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister alone. There was no statute. The convention was that the senior-most Election Commissioner moved up to CEC when the post fell vacant.
That changed in 2023.
In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (March 2023), a Supreme Court constitution bench held that the President should appoint election commissioners on the advice of a panel comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (or leader of the largest opposition party), and the Chief Justice of India — pending a law from Parliament.
Parliament responded with the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. The CJI was replaced in the panel by a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. The selection panel as enacted is therefore:
- Prime Minister (chair).
- Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha.
- A Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM.
Two of the three panel members are, by definition, drawn from the ruling government. The opposition leader is outvoted by construction. This has been the subject of public criticism and an active legal challenge in the Supreme Court.
The protection layer
Once appointed, the CEC enjoys constitutional protections under Article 324(5):
- The CEC's tenure runs for six years or until age 65, whichever is earlier.
- The CEC's conditions of service cannot be varied to the CEC's disadvantage after appointment.
- The CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds prescribed for a judge of the Supreme Court — that is, by a parliamentary impeachment-equivalent motion requiring two-thirds majority in both houses.
The other two ECs do not have the same protection: they can be removed on the CEC's recommendation. This asymmetry is itself a long-running concern, because it makes the two ECs structurally dependent on the CEC's goodwill.
The accountability gap
Here is the bit that powers the CJP demand. Between the formal protection of the CEC and the practical reality of running elections, there is a gap:
- Decisions on MCC violations are taken by the ECI in plenary — but the publication of dissent has historically been rare. When EC Ashok Lavasa publicly noted dissents on MCC matters in 2019, the ECI removed dissent publication from its public output. Lavasa was later transferred out.
- There is no statutory time-bound process by which a citizen can compel an investigation of a vote deletion. Complaints go to the BLO, then ERO, then DEO, then state CEO, then ECI — and the timelines are aspirational, not enforceable.
- There is no Parliamentary committee with statutory oversight of the ECI's day-to-day functioning. The CAG audits the ECI's accounts but does not look at electoral conduct.
- The CEC has never, in 75 years, been impeached or even formally censured.
"Strict, time-bound action against the Election Commission for vote deletion. Investigate every confirmed deletion within a fixed window, publish findings, act against responsible officers. No more inquiries that outlive the elections they were meant to protect."
— CJP Manifesto, point 4
What CJP proposes — in three steps
Read together, demands #2 and #4 of the CJP manifesto add up to a layered accountability proposal.
Step 1: Restore the CJI to the appointment panel
Walk back the 2023 statute to the Anoop Baranwal framework. This is a quick, popular, and constitutionally clean move that has the support of the legal academy across the political spectrum.
Step 2: Statutory, time-bound deletion grievance redressal
Codify a 30-day window for every confirmed vote-deletion complaint, with a published outcome. Failure to meet the window auto-escalates to a designated tribunal. See our deeper explainer on vote deletion in India for the operational case.
Step 3: Criminal accountability at the top
This is where the CJP's most controversial demand lives — the UAPA-against-CEC clause. Whether or not UAPA itself is the right vehicle, the principle is that systemic vote-deletion failure should not be cost-free for the office that owns the rolls.
The objection — and why CJP shrugs at it
The standard objection is that the ECI is already a constitutional body and should be insulated from political pressure. The CJP's reply is twofold.
- Insulation is not the same as immunity. The Supreme Court is also a constitutional body, and judges can be impeached. The CAG is also a constitutional body, and the comptroller's office is subject to public scrutiny.
- The current "insulation" has not actually produced an insulated body — the appointment panel is government-stacked, and the ECI has not historically resisted government pressure with public dissent. If the insulation is a fiction, accountability is the corrective.
Why this fight matters now
The 2024 Lok Sabha and the 2024 Maharashtra assembly elections produced more sustained public concern about electoral integrity than any cycle in recent memory. The CJP did not invent the issue; it took the simmering anger and turned it into a programmable demand. It is the same instinct that drives the rest of the five-point manifesto — name the institution, name the failure, name the fix.
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